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Once effective coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) vaccines 
are developed, they will be scarce. This presents the question 
of how to distribute them fairly across countries. Vaccine al-
location among countries raises complex and controversial 
issues involving public opinion, diplomacy, economics, public 
health, and other considerations. Nevertheless, many na-
tional leaders, international organizations, and vaccine pro-
ducers recognize that one central factor in this decision-
making is ethics (1, 2). Yet little progress has been made to-
ward delineating what constitutes fair international distribu-
tion of vaccine. Many have endorsed “equitable distribution 
of COVID-19…vaccine” without describing a framework or 
recommendations (3, 4). Two substantive proposals for the 
international allocation of a COVID-19 vaccine have been ad-
vanced, but are seriously flawed. We offer a more ethically 
defensible and practical proposal for the fair distribution of 
COVID-19 vaccine: the Fair Priority Model. 
The Fair Priority Model is primarily addressed to three 
groups. One is the COVAX facility—led by Gavi, the World 
Health Organization (WHO), and the Coalition for Epidemic 
Preparedness Innovations (CEPI)—which intends to pur-
chase vaccines for fair distribution across countries (5). A sec-
ond group is vaccine producers. Thankfully, many producers 
have publicly committed to a “broad and equitable” interna-
tional distribution of vaccine (2). The last group is national 
governments, some of whom have also publicly committed to 
a fair distribution (1). 
These groups need a clear framework for reconciling com-
peting values, one that they and others will rightly accept as 
ethical and not just as an assertion of power. The Fair Priority 
Model specifies what a fair distribution of vaccines entails, 
giving content to their commitments. Moreover, acceptance 
of this common ethical framework will reduce duplication 
and waste, easing efforts at a fair distribution. That, in turn, 
will enhance producers’ confidence that vaccines will be 
fairly allocated to benefit people, thereby motivating an in-
crease in vaccine supply for international distribution. 
 
VACCINE NATIONALISM 
Those who think countries will inevitably engage in “vaccine 
nationalism” (4) may deem an ethical framework for vaccine 
distribution among countries irrelevant. Public sentiment in 
some countries for retaining vaccine developed within their 
borders is strong, and many governments will also try to ob-
tain vaccines produced elsewhere. But an ethical framework 
has broad relevance even in the face of nationalist attitudes. 
Rather than simply asserting that might makes right, govern-
ments typically appeal to national partiality: a country’s right 
and duty to prioritize its own citizens. 
Some defend national partiality as ethical (6–8). Fellow 
citizens share “associative ties,” common governmental, civic, 
and other institutions, and a sense of shared identity (6, 7). 
Also, the legitimate authority of representative government 
officials inheres in their representing and promoting the in-
terests of their citizens. Plausibly, these relations support al-
lowing countries to prioritize citizens over foreigners for 
vaccines (6). Others view national partiality as unethical: Peo-
ple’s entitlement to lifesaving resources should not depend 
on nationality (9). 
Regardless of whether some national partiality is ethical, 
unlimited national partiality is not (6–8). Associative ties only 
justify a government’s giving some priority to its own citizens, 
not absolute priority (6). Moreover, associative ties extend 
across national borders, and citizens of different countries 
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share common institutions (7). Finally, national governments 
have cross-border responsibilities to help satisfy fundamental 
needs like basic health care, particularly in a global health 
emergency (7). 
Reasonable defenders of national partiality will differ on 
how much priority countries should give their citizens for 
vaccines. To establish the need for an equitable international 
distribution, it is unnecessary to determine an optimal level 
of priority. It is sufficient to identify a clear upper bound: 
Reasonable national partiality does not permit retaining 
more vaccine than the amount needed to keep the rate of 
transmission (Rt) below 1, when that vaccine could instead 
mitigate substantial COVID-19–related harms in other coun-
tries that have been unable to keep Rt below 1 through ongo-
ing public-health efforts. The marginal benefit of additional 
doses of vaccine in a country able to keep Rt below 1 generally 
will pale in comparison to the potential benefits to countries 
whose Rt remains above 1—at least until booster vaccination 
is needed to maintain immunity. Hence, with Rt below 1, 
there will not be sufficient vaccine-preventable harm to jus-
tify retaining vaccine. When a government reaches the limit 
of national partiality, it should release vaccines for other 
countries. This makes an account of fair allocation among 
countries relevant to reasonable national governments. 
 
THREE FUNDAMENTAL VALUES 
Fairly distributing a COVID-19 vaccine among countries is a 
problem of distributive justice. Although governments will be 
the initial recipients of vaccine, fair distribution across coun-
tries must reflect a moral concern for the ultimate recipients: 
individuals. Three values are particularly relevant: benefiting 
people and limiting harm, prioritizing the disadvantaged, 
and equal moral concern. 
Benefiting people and limiting harm is widely recognized 
as important across ethical theories. Realizing this value re-
quires defining relevant benefits, measuring them, and as-
sessing the relative urgency—the importance and time 
sensitivity—of countries’ needs. A successful vaccine pro-
duces direct benefits by protecting people against death and 
morbidity caused by infection. It also produces indirect ben-
efits by reducing death and morbidity arising from health sys-
tems overstressed by the pandemic, and by reducing poverty 
and social hardship such as closed schools. 
Prioritizing the disadvantaged is a fundamental value in 
ethics and global health (10, 11). Realizing this value requires 
that vaccine distribution reflect special concern for people 
who are disadvantaged. Fairly distributing a COVID-19 vac-
cine internationally therefore requires assessing different 
types of disadvantage. Are the worst-off countries those expe-
riencing the greatest poverty? Those where people have the 
lowest life expectancies? 
Equal moral concern requires treating similar individuals 
similarly and not discriminating on the basis of morally irrel-
evant differences, such as sex, race, and religion. Distributing 
different quantities of vaccine to different countries is not 
discriminatory if it effectively benefits people while prioritiz-
ing the disadvantaged. 
 
THE FAIR PRIORITY MODEL 
To guide fair distribution of vaccine across countries, we pro-
pose the Fair Priority Model. Fair allocation must seek to mit-
igate future adverse effects of COVID-19. We focus on three 
types of harms directly or indirectly caused by COVID-19. 
First, COVID-19 kills people and causes permanent organ 
damage. Second, the pandemic indirectly harms health even 
for the uninfected by straining health care systems, raising 
mortality rates for common conditions, causing stress that 
harms mental health, and accelerating the spread of disease 
by hindering immunizations. Third, the pandemic has devas-
tated the global economy, causing unemployment, economic 
decline, poverty, and starvation. Economics and health inter-
act: Worsening economic conditions harm health, and a 
worsening pandemic harms the economy. 
The pandemic forces allocators to decide where a vac-
cine’s harm-reducing powers are most urgently needed. 
Three dimensions of harm are important. Are the harms ir-
reversible? How devastating are they? And can they be com-
pensated? 
On these three dimensions, preventing death—especially 
premature death—is particularly urgent. Death is uniquely 
devastating, and those who die for want of vaccine cannot be 
compensated later on. Surveys further suggest popular agree-
ment that a premature death that prevents someone’s exer-
cising their skills or realizing their goals later in life is worse 
than a death later in life (11, 12). Ethicists have similarly ar-
gued that preventing early deaths—deaths that are more 
prevalent in poorer countries—is both prudent and ethical 
(10, 13). 
Death, however, is not the only irreversible and devastat-
ing harm. COVID-19 causes strokes and organ damage with 
long-term consequences. It also diminishes education and 
causes unemployment and poverty that impose long-term 
devastation. 
The Fair Priority Model proceeds in three phases, prevent-
ing more urgent harms earlier (see the Table). Phase 1 aims 
at reducing premature deaths and other irreversible direct 
and indirect health impacts. Phase 2 continues to address en-
during health harms but additionally aims at reducing seri-
ous economic and social deprivations such as the closure of 
nonessential businesses and schools. Restoring these activi-
ties will lower unemployment, reduce poverty, and improve 
health. Finally, phase 3 aims at reducing community trans-
mission, which in turn reduces spread among countries and 
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economic and social activities. 
Implementing each phase of the model requires determin-
ing the number of vaccine doses each country should receive 
and the order of receipt. The countries will then allocate vac-
cine internally to individuals. We expect that they will ini-
tially focus on areas where premature mortality can be 
reduced. Determining how many vaccine doses are allocated 
to each country depends on the marginal improvement in 
ethically relevant metrics that each dose achieves. There are 
likely to be multiple distributions of vaccine as supply be-
comes available over time. 
Five factors guide the choice of metrics for each phase: (i) 
fidelity to the underlying ethical values; (ii) simplicity; (iii) 
previous use in global health and development; (iv) ease of 
obtaining rapid but reasonable estimates as the pandemic 
evolves; and (v) sensitivity to relevant harms that are difficult 
to measure directly. 
In phase 1, we propose using Standard Expected Years of 
Life Lost (SEYLL) averted per dose of vaccine as the metric 
for premature death (14). SEYLL calculates life years lost 
compared to a standardized reference life table—that is, a 
person’s life expectancy at each age as estimated on the basis 
of the lowest observed age-specific mortality rates anywhere 
in the world. 
SEYLL has three major advantages. First, it regards all 
deaths as important but earlier deaths as particularly im-
portant. Thus, it integrates the aims of limiting harm and of 
prioritizing the least advantaged, particularly because early 
deaths are more frequent in low-income countries and are a 
proxy for being disadvantaged overall (10). Second, SEYLL in-
corporates equal moral concern by valuing a life saved at a 
given age identically across countries, regardless of preexist-
ing conditions or differences in national life expectancy. Fi-
nally, SEYLL is a standard metric used in global burden-of-
disease calculations (14). 
Phase 2 retains SEYLL as the health metric, treating it as 
a mortality measure and a proxy for morbidity. The novelty 
and uncertain long-term effects of COVID-19 preclude using 
more typical measures of morbidity, such as Years Lived with 
Disability. 
No single socioeconomic metric integrates benefiting peo-
ple and prioritizing the disadvantaged. Accordingly, we pro-
pose two metrics for phase 2 that capture overall economic 
improvement and the extent to which people would be spared 
from poverty. Because poverty is an extreme form of depriva-
tion, people’s moral claim to avoid poverty is especially ur-
gent. The Fair Priority Model measures poverty by the 
projected reduction in the absolute size of the poverty gap 
per dose of vaccine, with the poverty line set at a uniform 
absolute level to be selected by the implementers. The poverty 
gap is the ratio by which the mean income of the poor falls 
below the poverty line; it accounts for both the prevalence 
and depth of poverty. Overall economic impact is measured 
by the projected absolute improvement in gross national in-
come (GNI) per vaccine dose. Considering absolute improve-
ment in GNI per dose is preferable to considering 
improvement in per capita GNI or percentage improvement 
in GNI, which would favor countries with smaller popula-
tions or economies and permit unnecessary harm without 
prioritizing the disadvantaged. Moreover, increased GNI in 
one country will also lead to cross-border gains through 
trade, employment, and transfers. These simple economic 
metrics combine to ensure that vaccines prevent substantial 
harms and prioritize the disadvantaged. 
In phase 3, countries with higher transmission rates are 
initially prioritized, but all countries should eventually re-
ceive sufficient vaccine to halt transmission, which is pro-
jected to require that 60 to 70% of the population be immune. 
 
FLEXIBILITY OF THE MODEL 
Specifying how vaccines should be allocated will require in-
tegration of the model with data and empirical forecasts. For 
instance, in phase 1, minimizing SEYLL might mean immun-
izing those at high risk of death, those most likely to transmit 
infection, or those most at risk of initial infection. The vac-
cination strategy that best averts SEYLL depends on each 
country’s demography, prevalent comorbidities, and health 
system capacity, as well as open scientific questions: Will vac-
cines reduce severity but not transmission, be less effective in 
the elderly, or require periodic boosters? The WHO’s Strate-
gic Advisory Group of Experts is currently evaluating how 
much harm each strategy prevents. Similarly, the World Bank 
is evaluating the impact of COVID-19 on countries’ economic 
activity and world poverty. These or similar organizations can 
provide the analytic forecasts to guide actual distribution of 
the vaccines over time by the COVAX facility or vaccine pro-
ducers. By specifying metrics that should guide allocation 
and monitoring the vaccine’s effect on outcomes, the Fair Pri-
ority Model naturally accommodates changes in our 
knowledge of COVID-19. 
How much vaccine should be distributed in each phase? 
Empirical uncertainty makes it impractical to fully specify 
the transition between phases now. However, distributors 
might set the first transition at the point where a vaccine suc-
cessfully reduces the burden of COVID-19 from an emergency 
to the level of established health challenges. For example, 
phase 2 might commence once a vaccine reduces worldwide 
SEYLL due to COVID-19 to a level analogous to the burden of 
influenza. Similarly, the transition to phase 3 might begin 
once additional vaccines either successfully narrow the pov-
erty gap to prepandemic levels or encounter substantially di-
minishing returns in that effort. Because the distribution of 
vaccine doses among countries is linked to the impact of the 
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progress to the next phase approximately simultaneously. 
This is approximate; some countries may struggle to control 
their outbreaks even with vaccine, but that should not pre-
clude the rest of the world progressing to the next phase. Alt-
hough we have delineated the ethical framework and metrics, 
epidemiological and economic assessments using the best 
available data will be needed to help determine when a phase 
should be considered complete. 
 
COMPARISON WITH OTHER PROPOSALS 
Two schemes for the international distribution of COVID-19 
vaccine have been proposed. First, the WHO suggests that 
countries receive doses proportional to population in phase I 
(15). Phase I begins with 3% of each country’s population re-
ceiving vaccines, and population-proportional allocation con-
tinues until every country has vaccinated 20% of its 
population. The COVAX facility currently accepts this pro-
posal, which is undergoing revision (5). 
A population-based distribution appears to express equal 
moral concern and may appear to be politically tenable. How-
ever, it mistakenly assumes that equality requires treating 
differently situated countries identically rather than equita-
bly responding to their different needs. Equally populous 
countries can face markedly different levels of premature 
death and economic devastation from COVID-19. Aid to coun-
tries typically is provided in approximate response to the se-
verity of problems. Providing aid merely in proportion to 
population is unjustified and almost never used. For instance, 
it would be unethical to allocate antiretrovirals for HIV on 
the basis of population, rather than on HIV burden. Likewise, 
a fair distribution of COVID-19 vaccines should respond to 
the pandemic’s differential severity in different countries. 
The second proposal distributes vaccine to countries ac-
cording to the number of front-line health care workers, the 
proportion of population over 65, and the number of people 
with comorbidities in the country (15). This proposal seems 
to prioritize protecting those judged most likely to die and 
preventing health system collapse due to health care workers’ 
illness. But it is an empirical question whether this prioriti-
zation optimally reduces death, let alone premature death or 
serious economic harms. Preferentially immunizing health 
care workers may not substantially reduce harm in higher-
income countries where personal protective equipment effec-
tively protects health workers. Instead, vaccinating those 
whose housing or occupation or age puts them at greatest 
risk of spreading infection, or people at highest risk of be-
coming infected, might best prevent harm. Only data can de-
termine which approach best fulfills the ethical value of 
reducing premature deaths. 
Further, because the second proposal does not use SEYLL 
to correct for disadvantages due to differential national life 
expectancy, it compounds disadvantage compared to the Fair 
Priority Model. Since low-and middle-income countries have 
fewer older residents and health care workers per capita than 
high-income countries, this scheme allocates less vaccine to 
countries already disadvantaged by weaker health systems 
and shorter average life spans. 
 
OBJECTIONS CONSIDERED 
We consider three potential objections to the Fair Priority 
Model. First, some might argue that countries should receive 
vaccine only if they can provide assurance that they will dis-
tribute it to minimize premature deaths and mitigate eco-
nomic harms, and have the infrastructure to effectively do so. 
Allocating vaccine doses to countries lacking the infra-
structure to administer them would unjustifiably waste a life-
saving resource. Consequently, fair allocation may be 
conditional on infrastructural capacity and might also re-
quire efforts to help poorer countries develop such infrastruc-
ture. 
Conditioning vaccine on fair distribution within countries 
is more problematic. A fair distribution of emergency sup-
plies ultimately aims at helping individuals: They are the 
ones who live or die, prosper or are impoverished. Some au-
thoritarian countries may do an excellent job of distributing 
vaccine to minimize health, economic, and other harms. As 
long as individuals benefit, fair global distribution among 
countries should neither require that intranational distribu-
tion of a vaccine be perfectly just nor seek to punish unre-
lated injustices. However, some countries may grossly 
mismanage their domestic vaccine allocations, by, for in-
stance, hoarding doses for a ruling elite. Addressing such 
hoarding may require making actual vaccine distribution 
among countries in subsequent phases or subsequent 
tranches within a phase conditional on a country’s having 
distributed the vaccine reasonably fairly to its members. But 
outside of extreme cases, withholding vaccines to enforce 
conditionality inflicts disproportionate burdens, making con-
ditionality rarely appropriate. 
Second, some might suggest that the Fair Priority Model 
unfairly disadvantages countries that have effectively sup-
pressed viral transmission without a vaccine and rewards 
those who have responded ineffectively. 
A fair distribution of vaccine among countries must miti-
gate future health, economic, and other harms spawned by 
COVID-19. It should not be backward looking, punishing or 
rewarding countries for their COVID-19 response or aiming 
to redress past injustices. The individuals whose lives and 
livelihoods are at risk often had little say in their govern-
ments’ response to COVID-19. Further, medicine espouses 
treating people regardless of responsibility for their illness. 
Smokers who develop lung cancer and malaria patients who 
did not use bed nets are not denied care. 
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allocating vaccine on the basis of expected benefits, it does 
not exclude countries that have effectively suppressed 
COVID-19 transmission by making economic sacrifices. If 
these sacrifices translate into ongoing economic harms that 
vaccines can alleviate—an empirical question—they are ad-
dressed in phase 2. Waiting until phase 2 to address these 
economic harms is appropriate because premature deaths are 
more urgent and less compensable. Furthermore, develop-
ment aid might address the effects of economic sacrifices 
more effectively than COVID-19 vaccines. 
Third, some might worry that the metrics are too uncer-
tain and demanding to calculate, or could perversely incen-
tivize countries to exaggerate the spread and harm of COVID-
19 to secure more vaccine earlier. 
In a novel, rapidly evolving pandemic, any approach suf-
ficiently sophisticated to meaningfully operationalize ethical 
values will require approximations as well as judgments 
about the relative weight to assign different metrics, such as 
SEYLL and the poverty gap. Simple metrics like population 
size avoid approximations and trade-offs but fail to measure 
what morally matters. Moreover, the proposed metrics are 
routinely used in global health, and basing vaccine distribu-
tion on these metrics will encourage collection and reporting 
of accurate data on changes in mortality and poverty related 
to COVID-19. 
Regarding perverse incentives, countries are unlikely to 
exaggerate the spread and harm of COVID-19 to secure more 
vaccine. Any temptation to exaggerate suffering from the 
pandemic will be tempered by a country’s need to reassure 
its public, visitors, investors, and others about control of 
COVID-19 to stimulate economic activity and allow travel. 
Also, as Taiwan and New Zealand show, there are notable soft 




The Fair Priority Model is the best embodiment of the ethical 
values of limiting harms, benefiting the disadvantaged, and 
recognizing equal concern. The responsibility for implement-
ing the model rests with countries, international organiza-
tions, and vaccine producers. They need to use the 
cooperative mechanisms that have been created to deal with 
the pandemic, such as the COVAX facility. Organizations also 
have indispensable roles in empirically assessing how vaccine 
distribution in fact affects countries with respect to metrics 
like SEYLL, poverty, and GNI. Ultimately, the model offers 
governments, international organizations, and vaccine pro-
ducers a practical way to fulfill their pledges to distribute vac-
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